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PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS TO THE LAWYER
HANDLING A BANKRUPTCY CASE
By FRANK MCLAUGHLIN, Esquire, Referee in Bankruptcy
I HAVE a recollection of someone (I think it was a law
book agent) saying it was more important to know
where to find the law than to know the law; but I state,
with all seriousness to the lawyers here present, that it is
equally important to know the law and to know where to
find it.
The lawyer must know the law for his own purpose, but
he must know where to find it for the benefit of his opponent
and the Court. For these reasons, the first concern of a lawyer
entering into the field of Bankruptcy practice is to know
where to find the law, even though he may not know what
it is before he finds it.
The Bankruptcy Law is in the nature of a specialty,
covering the subject of business failures, and the Courts of
Bankruptcy are Courts having jurisdiction in rem and in per-
sonam, without limit as to the amount involved and with-
out restrictions as to territorial limits as to situs of the prop-
erty.
The present Bankruptcy Act, which is known as the Act
of 1898, was adopted by the Congress of the United States
under the power given it by Section 8 of Article I of the Con-
stitution of the United States, reading as follows:
"Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the sub-
ject of bankruptcy throughout the United States and becomes a part
of the supreme law of the land and is paramount in authority."
Its purpose is defined in Wilson us. City Bank, 17 Wal-
lace U. S. 473, to be as follows:
"The primary object of a bankruptcy law is to secure a just distri-
bution of the bankrupt's property among his creditors; the secondary
object is the release of the bankrupt from the obligation to pay his
debts."
The laws, or rules having the effect of laws relating to
bankruptcy are the following:
First: The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, with its amendments
of 1903, 1910, 1926 and 1933, comprising 77 sections.
These sections, in the' ordinary copies of the law used by text
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writers and others, and even by the Congress of the United
States, are numbered from one to seventy-seven, inclusive,
and embody all of the substantive law on the subject.
Those of you who are familiar with the United States
Code will know that in 1926 the Congress made a compila-
tion called "The Code of the Laws of the United States of
America," ordinarily known as the "U. S. Code," or "U. S.
C."; and in this Code, title "Eleven" is the one containing
the Bankruptcy Act in full, with annotations; but you will
also find upon examination that the Sections in the Bank-
ruptcy Act, after the first section, do not conform to the num-
bering in the U. S. Code, due to the fact that the Code sec-
tions are not consecutively numbered-the object, as stated,
being to allow amendments to be inserted. For instance, Sec-
tion 14 of the Act of 1898, relating to discharges of bank-
rupts, is Section 32 of the U. S. Code-and so on. The U.
S. Code as now constituted, however, does not contain Sec-
tions 73 to 77, inclusive, these sections being the Acts of
March 3, 1933.
Second: The General Orders in Bankruptcy-On the
28th of November, 1898, the Supreme Court of the United
States adopted and established certain General Orders, to take
effect on the first Monday, being the second day of January,
1899, and were meant to be Rules to aid in carrying into
effect the Bankruptcy Act; and as stated in Folda vs. Zilmer,
14 Fed. (2nd) 843, have the force and effect of law so far
as they are not in conflict with the express provisions of the
Act.
The original draft of the General Orders were thirty-
eight in number, and while some of them seem to reiterate the
language of the Act itself, most of them are used for, or meant
to be, aids in understanding the Act, or directions for prac-
tice under the Act.
On April 13, 1925, General Order No. 39 was adopted,
and the last General Order adopted was that of May 15,
1933, relating to the appointment of Ancillary Receivers.
There are also General Orders relating to the practice
under the new Bankruptcy Act of 1933, comprising Sections
74, 75, 76 and 77. There are now fifty-one of these General
Orders in effect.
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At the time of the adoption of the original General Orders
in 1898, the Supreme Court prepared and promulgated what
they called "Forms in Bankruptcy." These forms are in
skeleton form, but represent workable outlines of the various
petitions, orders, notices, etc., used in bankruptcy proceedings
by bankrupts, creditors, clerks, referees, and others. These
forms are numbered from one to seventy-five, inclusive, and
are made for the purpose of obtaining uniformity in the prac-
tice and proceedings throughout the United States.
Gilbert Collier, in his Second Edition, has added to the
official forms-taken from Hagar and Alexander-to a total
of 221 forms.
In the District of Colorado, like in other judicial districts,
the Court has adopted District Rules in Bankruptcy covering
subjects not embodied in the foregoing literature on the sub-
ject of bankruptcy-notably, the defining of the bankruptcy
districts in the jurisdiction, the matter of publication of no-
tices to creditors (the notices are lengthened from those pro-
vided in Section 58 of the Act), the subject of attorneys' fees;
the return date of subpoenaes, reclamation proceedings, etc.
The literature on the subject of bankruptcy comprises the
decisions of the District Courts of the United States, Courts
of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States,
which have been of such importance in the last few years as
to strengthen the operation of the law materially and sub-
stantially.
Text books on the subject of bankruptcy are numerous.
The ones ordinarily used are: Collier on Bankruptcy in the
original edition of 1923, known as the 13th Edition, com-
prising four volumes; and the re-write of the text in the
Amendment of 1927, known as Gilbert's Collier on Bank-
ruptcy; and the Amendment, known as the Second Edition of
Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy, brought down to November
1, 1930. Also, Remington on Bankruptcy, comprising nine
volumes, with annotations, and also including an Annual
Supplement service which includes annotations of the text
annually; Prentice-Hall, Inc., have a loose-leaf annotated
volume which includes the law itself and the General Orders.
The cost of these various volumes, in the latest editions,
in the cheapest bindings, is: Gilbert's Collier, 2nd Ed.. $25;
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Remington on Bankruptcy, $35; and Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
$10.
The practitioner who desires to follow this practice is al-
most required to have at least one of the text books in addi-
tion to the General Orders and Forms.
To practice in Bankruptcy Courts requires a certificate of
admission to the District Court of the United States at the
residence of the practitioner. Being thus equipped, let us sup-
pose that John Doe, an individual, presents himself as your
client to be initiated into the mysteries of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. You have certain preliminary duties to yourself, to
the bankrupt and to the Court, which should not be over-
looked, before you accept the employment.
First, you should secure from the bankrupt the informa-
tion necessary to include in his schedule. This information
should be accurate and in detail, and should correctly repre-
sent the debts of the bankrupt, segregated into prior or lien
claims, taxes, wage claims, etc., so that they may be properly
inserted in the schedule; then a complete list of creditors
whose claims are unsecured and which have no priorities, un-
der Section 64 of the Law, including the name of the general
creditors-alphapetically arranged-their addresses, by street
number, city or town and state; and the details of the origin
of the debt. All these debts are a part of Schedule A.
The second part of the schedule, B, relates to the assets
of the Bankrupt, and here should appear in detail all the
information regarding his property-real, personal or mixed
-where located, its value, and such details as will enable the
Trustee to readily locate it and take it into his possession.
Of the things that are of importance in addition to the
items to be entered in his schedule, you should know some-
thing of the history of the bankrupt's business at least twelve
months prior to the date of his petition, as it may be found
that the bankrupt has advisedly, or otherwise, committed
acts inimical to the law which will prevent his discharge, or
possibly involve him in more serious trouble.
If your client has been a member of a co-partnership in
which he has a personal liability and from which he seeks
to be discharged, you should be sure to have your schedule
show the name of the co-partnership and other details to indi-
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cate that a discharge is desired from such partnership liabili-
ties, as distinguished from his personal debts.
If your client is a partnership only, you should, in addi-
tion to the schedule of partnership liabilities and assets, sched-
ule the assets and liabilities of the individual partners; and
in partnership cases you must have all the partners sign the
petition and schedules.
If your client is a corporation, you should see that the
corporation directors have adopted a resolution authorizing
the filing of the petition and schedules, and authorizing some
person named in the resolution to sign the petition and also
to sign the schedule on behalf of the corporation.
Before you file the schedule, you may yet pause and reflect
as to whether, in fact, you may have discovered some fact
not in the petition or schedule-something that would pre-
vent the bankrupt's discharge-because his liability is not
measured entirely by what the Court may know from the
record filed, but also by what the creditors might know off
the record.
The proceeding incident to filing a petition and schedule
for a bankrupt upon his own application is known as a vol-
untary proceeding and is open to any person who is not able
to pay his debts and who desires his creditors to receive a
distribution of his property through the Bankruptcy Court,
and who desires to receive a discharge from his debts.
A voluntary petition does not require the bankrupt to be
insolvent, necessarily. He may be perfectly solvent and yet
file a petition in bankruptcy.
The second class of proceedings is known as involuntary
proceedings, which are initiated by not less than three un-
secured creditors of the bankrupt holding debts aggregating
not less than $500, and which proceeding is without the
consent of the bankrupt. When the petition is filed by the
creditors, it must, in general terms, allege some ground for
adjudication against him. These grounds are enumerated in
Section 3 of the Act; and the proceeding is not permissible
unless the person proceeded against is insolvent at the time of
the filing of the petition; and if the person proceeded against
is able to show that he was not insolvent, the adjudication
will be refused, and the bankrupt has the right, if he so de-
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mands it, of a jury to try the question of his insolvency (See
Sec. 19).
Neither a voluntary petition can be filed by, nor an in-
voluntary petition filed against, a municipal corporation, a
railroad corporation (except under Section 77, enacted in
1933); nor an insurance company, nor a banking corpora-
tion; and since the Amendment of 1932, a building and loan
association; and the person against whom an involuntaary
petition is filed must owe debts to the aggregate amount of
$1,000 or over.
When a petition is filed-whether voluntary or involun-
tary-the petitioner must pay to the Clerk of the United
States District Court a fee of $30; and if this fee is advanced
by a third party, it is recoverable as a priority out of the assets
of the estate.
When a voluntary petition is filed, it is adjudicated by
the Judge on the same or a subsequent date, by an ex parte
order. If no answer is filed in an involuntary proceeding
within the time fixed by the subpoena, adjudication follows
in like manner upon suggestion of the petitioning creditors.
If either a voluntary or an involuntary petition is filed
at a time when the Judge is absent from the District, the Clerk
makes a certificate of the absence of the Judge and sends the
papers to the Referee who makes the adjudication.
Following adjudication, the case goes to the Referee for
further proceedings and the Referee then becomes the Court
to issue all orders and try all questions of fact and law, and
render final decisions thereon, subject only to petition for
review, as provided in General Order No. 27.
Orders that may not be made by the Referee are: Orders
approving compositions under Section 12; orders of dis-
charge, under Section 14; and injunction orders to stay pro-
ceedings of a Court, officers of the United States, or of the
State, under General Order No. 12.
These orders, however, are generally made by the Judge
as a result of a trial before the Referee and upon his opinion
and recommendation, at the consideration of which parties
may appear, and present reasons why the Referee's recom-
mendations should not be adopted by the Judge.
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Further appeals may be had by the litigant to the Court
of Appeals, under Sections 24 and 25 of the Act-under
Section 24 to superintend and revise in matters of law, and
under Section 25 as an appeal in equity from adjudging, or
refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt; or denying a
discharge, or allowing or rejecting a debt or claim of $500 or
over.
Both sections provide for a review on a petition to be
filed within thirty days after the judgment appealed from.
These controversies may be certified to the Supreme Court
of the United States from the Circuit Court.
The duty of the Bankrupt, or his attorney, is to deposit
with the Referee $30 for costs, after which the first meeting
of creditors of the bankrupt is called, upon 14 days' notice,
by mail, and at this time it is the duty of the bankrupt to be
present, with his books and accounts, prepared to answer all
questions of creditors, or of the Bankruptcy Court, these
duties being defined in Section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act.
At this first meeting of creditors, it is well for the attorney
to observe the usual modesty of the profession in refraining
from objecting to the bankrupt giving testimony, even
though the questions directed at him may be in the nature
of leading questions, because it seems that at that meeting the
rules of evidence as to leading questions are not observed by
most of the Referees, under the approved practice in such
cases.
If it appears at this meeting that there are assets to be
administered, a Trustee is selected and he is required to qualify
by signing his acceptance and executing a surety bond in the
amount fixed. The subsequent duties of a Trustee who takes
possession of the property, is to cause it to be inventoried,
petition for an order of sale, upon notice as required by Sec-
tion 58 of the Act; and on the day and hour fixed, offer it
for sale; and following the sale, to make a report in writing
to the Referee, of the bids received; and upon confirmation by
the Referee, to deliver the property and collect the purchase
price; or, if not confirmed, to reoffer it until a sale can be
made.
When the sale is made and confirmed, the money is de-
posited in a depository bank named usually by the Judge
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of the Court, which has given a bond in an amount fixed by
the Court, in compliance with Section 61 of the Bankruptcy
Act; and thereafter, if there are no other complications, un-
settled litigation, or other property to be turned into money,
a meeting of creditors is called, at which attorneys' fees and
other claims are allowed, dividends ordered paid, and the case
is closed as far as the administration of the assets are con-
cerned.
The Referee keeps a complete docket of all orders made,
proceedings had and hearings held, witnesses examined,
money received, money paid out, with all of the details of
the payments, which is always done by check signed by the
Trustee and countersigned by the Referee; and at the closing
of the case, all papers are forwarded to the Clerk of the Court,
together with a statement of all financial and other transac-
tions, including cancelled checks and vouchers.
The case is then closed with the exception of the vital part
to the bankrupt, which is his discharge.
The records of a case are preserved in the Clerk's files.
Filing of claims against a bankrupt estate is provided for
in Section 57 of the Bankruptcy Act, and General Order
No. 21.
Prior to 1926, creditors were allowed one year to file
claims, but subsequent to that date, and at present, claims
must be filed within six months after the date of adjudication,
unless they are unliquidated claims and litigation is pending,
and one on which a subsequent judgment is rendered; but
claims of infants and insane persons, without guardians,
without notice, may be filed within one year after adjudica-
tion.
In filing claims, the forms in bankruptcy provide the
forms of proof. These are known generally as forms 3 1. 33,
34 and 35, being separate forms for individuals, corporations,
copartnerships, and agents, and may be obtained at almost
any stationery store or printer of blank forms.
If the claim is simply an account, unsecured note, or for
merchandise, it should be signed by the claimant or his agent,
authorized in writing; if a corporation, by its treasurer or
other chief officer; and properly sworn to-to which should
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be attached an itemized statement of account, the note, or
contract.
If a claim is based on a mortgage, or lien, or priority claim,
the original documents must be filed with the claim. These
documents are the note, mortgage, or other evidence of the
debt. After the claim is allowed these originals may be with-
drawn upon application and order by the Referee, on sub-
stituting copies.
Proof and allowance of a claim is a prerequisite to its
payment, or for any order affecting it.
WAGES of workmen, clerks and servants are the subject of
the first priority in payment out of the assets of an estate.
Following that priority, comes the payment of TAXES.
Attorneys at law are given favorable mention in Section
64 which permits one reasonable attorney's fee to be paid out
of the assets of the estate as costs of administration. This
"reasonable fee" is defined to be one fee in each case, which
means a distributive fee equivalent to one reasonable fee to
attorneys for the bankrupt, and attorney for the petitioning
creditors jointly; and Rule 5 of the rules of the District of
Colorado defines the maximum fees to be allowed to attorneys
other than attorneys for trustees, and a rule is now being pre-
pared to cover that subject.
The DISCHARGE may be applied for by the bankrupt after
one month and within twelve months after the date of adjudi-
cation; and when filed, a meeting of his creditors is called on
an order made by the Court, fixing a date for hearing before
the Referee. Upon this order the Referee gives notice to credi-
tors under Section 58 of the Act, and on a day appointed,
hears the petition for discharge, enters in the record any ap-
pearances in opposition thereto, if any; and if no opposition
is filed and the record of the bankrupt is clear, the Referee
refers it to the Judge, recommending that the discharge be
granted.
However, if any creditors desire to object, they must ap-
pear on the day fixed for the appearance of the bankrupt
before the Referee on the petition for discharge, and at that
time, file specifications of objections which must contain one
or more of the grounds stted in Section 14 of the Act.
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The Referee then sets the objections for hearing before
him under authority of the standing order of reference, takes
the testimony and writes his conclusions and recommenda-
tions, and files them for the attention of the Judge in grant-
ing or refusing a discharge.
The Bankrupt has the right of appeal from a refusal of
discharge, under Section 25 of the Act, which may proceed
as far as the Supreme Court of the United States.
EXEMPTIONS are allowed bankrupts in accordance with
the laws of the State in which the petition is filed, which
include exemptions on insurance policies and homesteads, in
addition to other general exemptions.
COMPOSITIONS are authorized by Section 12 of the
original Act and by Sections 74 and 75 of the Act of March,
1933.
A composition is simply a means authorized by the law,
by which a bankrupt, or a debtor, may bargain with his credi-
tors to settle their debts, either in full or on such terms of
payment as he feels himself able to make, measured by the
value of the property he owns. These proceedings may be had
after an adjudication in bankruptcy, or they may be had
without adjudication.
Section 12 is the section under which all classes of debtors
may seek composition, whether they are individuals, corpora-
tions, co-partnerships, etc.
Section 74 of the new Act applies to individuals only
and permits extensions of time for payment or compositions
of debts, in the manner thereinafter provided.
Section 75 of the Act of 1933 allows the same relief to
farmers only-and they must be dirt farmers at that.
Bankruptcy Courts are governed by certain rules set down
in the sections named as to confirmation of compositions, the
theory being that the debtor and his creditors may make al-
most any contract they desire to make except that a majority
of the whole number of creditors plus a majority in amount
of dollars of their total claims can control a composition, and
the minority creditors are then bound by the settlement so
made.
The Bankruptcy Courts will therefore examine the pro-
ceeding to determine that the debtor has acted fairly, and
DICTA
that the majority of creditors are not to profit in any way as
against the non-consenting creditors; and will also consider
the ability of the debtor, measured by the whole value of his
property, and if the transaction seems to be fair and reason-
able, confirmation of the Court will follow, in which case
the proceedings are dismissed, and the debtor and creditors are
left to their own resources in carrying out their contract.
Other subjects that may be mentioned are: Summary
trials, ancillary proceedings and equity jurisdiction of Bank-
ruptcy Courts.
In almost all bankruptcies of importance, litigation arises
between trustees and claimants of property under contracts
made with the bankrupt; and the question of the right of the
Bankruptcy Court to try these controversies summarily be-
comes an important consideration.
The claimant may not desire to submit the case to the
decisions of the Referee, in which case he will file with the
Referee, in response to an order to deliver, or an order to show
cause why delivery should not be made, or other order affect-
ing his property, a plea to the jurisdiction of the Referee to
try the case in a summary proceeding, which means a proceed-
ing without the intervention of a jury.
The right of the Trustee to have his case tried in a sum-
mary proceeding before the Referee depends largely upon the
possession of the property at the time of the filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy. If the property was taken from the
bankrupt more than four months before he filed his petition,
the claimant to it is entitled to have his case tried in a plenary
suit in a State Court; or, in certain cases, in a plenary suit to
a jury in the Federal Court; or, if the party proceeded against
has a claim to the property based upon some substantial right
which is not colorable, he may likewise have it removed to the
State Court for trial; but in all that class of cases where, upon
examination of the facts the Bankruptcy Court finds that
the bankupt had possession of the property, either by himself
or by his agent, or that the property has come into the pos-
session of the Bankruptcy Court or its Receiver or Trustee,
then the claimant is not entitled to have the controversy tried
in a plenary suit over the objections of the Receiver or the
Trustee.
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On the question of possession, the Bankruptcy Court is
the judge of its own jurisdiction.
It is hardly ever advisable for a claimant to file a plea to
the jurisdiction unless he can prove the adverse possession at
the date of bankruptcy, or within four months prior thereto ,
or show the possession of the property for a valuabale con-
sideration. It is only necessary that the claimant have a sub-
stantial right to litigate a claim to the property which is not
colorable, to succeed in his plea to the jurisdiction.
Ancillary proceedings are used in that class of bankrupt-
cies where property exists outside of the primary jurisdic-
tion; where, for instance, a bankrupt adjudicated in Cali-
fornia had a store in Denver, the Trustee in California has
the right, if he can, to sell the property in Colorado; but if,
for any reason, he desires to have it handled by local officers,
or in case of litigation of the property in Colorado, it is per-
missible for the Court of primary jurisdiction to certify the
record, which may be filed in the United States District Court
in Colorado, on which the Colorado Court will appoint an
ancillary receiver who simply acts under the direction of the
Court itself, or a special master of the Court in the matter of
the property within the ancillary jurisdiction, and remit the
proceeds to the Court of primary jurisdiction, out of which
claims are paid and in which claims are usually allowed.
The question of ancillary proceedings often raises the
question of the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts over
property outside of the State, but this question has been set
at rest by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Isaacs vs. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734, and
some other cases later referred to herein.
It is currently rumored on the street corner that Courts
of Bankruptcy are Courts of Equity, and we might profitably
examine the basis of this rumor.
Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act provides, inter alia, that:
"The District Courts of the United States in the several states,
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the District Courts
of the several territories and possessions, and the United States Court
in the District of Alaska are hereby made Courts of Bankruptcy and
are hereby invested, within their respective territorial limits, * * *
with such jurisdiction in law and in equity as will enable them to
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exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings in vacation in
chambers and during their respective terms."
General Order 37 provides:
"In proceedings in equity instituted for the purpose of carrying
into effect the provisions of the Act, or for enforcing the rights and
remedies given by it, the rules of equity practice established by the
Supreme Court of the United States shall be followed as nearly as
may be."
Remington on Bankruptcy, Volume I, Section 23, states
the rule as follows:
"Bankruptcy proceedings are a branch of equity jurisprudence,"
citing in the note a long line of cases.
"* * * The Bankruptcy Court has the incidental power to grant
any equitable relief which may be necessary in the administration and
distribution of the estate."
I think, however, there is considerable reason to believe
that the statute should be strictly followed where it speaks,
and that the equitable jurisdiction should apply only where
the statute does not speak.
The sections quoted state that the rules of practice in
equity shall be followed "as nearly as may be" and equity
would apply more especially in aid of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, as, for example, suits in equity to recover preferences;
to set aside fraudulent transactions, etc.
The last few years have been prolific in notable decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States upon many ques-
tions arising in bankruptcy! but as a ground-work for the
bankruptcy lawyer, only those cases dealing with the larger
questions are of basic interest. Other decisions are of interest
only when concrete cases arise.
Among the cases of general interest which should be
familiar to all lawyers practicing in Bankruptcy Courts, are
the following:
May vs. Henderson, 5 Amer. Bankruptcy Reports, New Series, 739.
(Opinion April, 1925.)
Taubell vs. Fox, 264 U. S. 426. (Opinion 1924.)
Isaacs vs. Hobbs Tie Z4 Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734. (Opinion
1931.)
Straton vs. New, 283 U. S. 318. (Opinion 1931.)
Cooper vs. Dasher, 290 U. S. 106.
Conrad, Rubin F-4 Lesser vs. Pender, Trustee, 289 U. S. 472.
'Dictaphun_
WE DIDN'T MEAN UNCONSCIOUS HUMOR, MR. EDITOR
After the appearance of the issue of DICTA for November last
this Department, unhappy at what it considered undeserved treatment,
wrote to the Editor-in-Chief complaining of certain editorial practices.
Among other things we insisted that this Department have exclusive
right to publish humorous material.
In the December issue the Editor omitted the reports of the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court!
LIFE ON A RETAINER
Milton D. Green, Esq., nemesis of unlicensed practitioners, reports
to the Editor-in-Chief that, "My Dear Roy: One of our clients has a
regular printed form upon which they report all accidents to us, filling
out the printed form as accurately as possible. We are in receipt of an
accident report from this client which states:
"Owner: John Doe.
"Kind of Property and Extent of Damage: Dog killed.
"Estimated cost of repairs: $3.00.
"I might add that we will vigorously contest the claim on the
ground of the dog's contributory negligence."
And we might add that all the accidents that come to our office
are brought in by our runners.
A VERY BRAIN-TRUSTY SET OF RULES
The December, 1934, Extension News, that thrilling publication
of the University of Colorado, gives notice of Extension Classes. Says
the News:
Who May Enroll?
"Any adult who thinks that he can profit by a course.
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"A student who has been refused readmission to the University
is not eligible for extension classes."
Which leaves us in this dilemma: Is a student who has been
kicked out of the University unable to think, or don't the authorities
care what he thinks?
THE TAXPAYERS' LAMENT
Added light from Extension News aforesaid is that if you think
you can be informed upon these, inter alia, matters without stirring
from home:
Labor's Needs-Can the Church Fill Them; Aviation; Creative
Writing; Verse Writing; English Language; Partial Differential Equa-
tions with Boundary Conditions; Advanced Reinforced Concrete De-
sign; Theory of Indeterminate Structures*; Psychology; Romance Lan-
guages; Grade School Music, etc., etc.
At the bottom of one page we find that "We give 350 courses by
Correspondnce," while on the reverse of that page is an exciting depart-
ment labeled "Campus Notes."
LAUGH OFF THIS COME-BACK
In a recent issue a w. k. legal ad weekly complained because Judge
Samuel W. Johnson, in a DICTA article, had killed off the editor-in-
chief of said weekly. After reading the issue of said weekly for Decem-
ber 29 we are sorry the judge, or somebody, hasn't killed off the editor.
Yes, and furthermore. Said weekly in its December 22 number
made a holler about DICTA appearing late, and, repeated hearsay blam-
ing the delay on Dictaphun. Said number of December 22 reached its
recipients on December 27!
*Refers to the Republican party. Should have been listed under Political Science.
or lack of it.
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
Office of the President
ScoTT M. LOFTIN
1140 North Dearborn Street
Chicago, Illinois
November 20, 1934.
To the Lawyers of America:
I invite your attention to the work and program of the American
Bar Association with a view of securing your cooperation and assist-
ance in what we are trying to do.
The American Bar Association is composed of some 27,000 law-
yers of America who are united in an effort to advance the general wel-
fare of the profession, to promote the standing of the bar with the
people, and to improve the character of its public service. At the pres-
ent time the Association is engaged in promoting the National Bar
Program which, to my mind, is one of the most important activities
the Association has ever undertaken. This program has five objectives,
as follows:
1. Enforcement of Criminal Law.
2. Raising the Standards of Legal Education and
Admission to the Bar.
3. Selection of Judges and Bar Activities in con-
nection therewith.
4. Elimination of the Unauthorized Practice of
the Law.
5. Enforcement of Professional Ethics.
I am stressing this program wherever I go and urging the other
officers of the Association to do likewise. We are endeavoring to co-
ordinate the work of the state and local bar associations with that of
our Association. To effectively carry out our program it is essential
that we have the cooperation of as many members of the profession as
possible.
I appeal to the members of the bar who are not already members
of the American Bar Association to affiliate with our Association. The
dues are $4.00 per year for those who have not yet passed the fifth
anniversary of their original admission to practice law and $8.00 for
others. All members receive the American Bar Association Journal,
with which you are doubtless familiar, and which alone is well worth
the annual dues.
Applications for membership may be secured from the central office
of the Association at 1140 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, or from
G. Dexter Blount, member of the General Council for Colorado, 404
Equitable Building, Denver, Colorado.
Trusting that you will join us in this great work, I am
Faithfully yours,
SCOTT M. LOFTIN.
OIL AND GAS-PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT-LACHES-ESTOPPEL
-Fitzwater vs. Norcross et al.-No. 13,281 -Decided Nov. 5,
1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
In 1926 plaintiff and one other owned certain oil and gas leases
and contracted with defendant for drilling same. The leases provided
forfeiture for non-fulfillment of drilling. The court below sustained
motion for non-suit.
1. The plaintiff failed to establish a breached contract.
2. Where the plaintiff remained inactive while defendants ex-
pended large sums of money and did a large amount of work in reli-
ance upon the leases and contracts, such action or failure to act consti-
tutes laches.
3. The plaintiff was estopped both under the pleadings and the
evidence.--Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PROCEEDINGS FOR REVIEW-Pollard
vs. Industrial Commissionr-No. 13,616-Decided Nov. 19, 1934
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Pollard prosecutes writ of error to reverse a judgment affirming an
award of the Industrial Commission refusing to reopen a case on its
own motion.
1. Under the Industrial Act where claimant neglects to apply
within ten days for a review of referee's findings and award, the claim-
ant loses his right to a review.
2. The power given to the commission to review an award on
its own motion is discretionary. Such action of the commission will
not be interfered with except upon the showing of fraud or a clear abuse
of discretion.-Judgment affirmed.
WATERS-IRRIGATION--SHORTAGE OF WATER-Johnston vs. Wan-
amaker Ditch Co.-No. 13,624-Decided Nov. 13, 1934--pin-
ion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Johnston, claiming the right to run water through a ditch on
payment of $2.50 annually, sued to recover alleged excess charges of
$200.00 and sought an injunction restraining the company and direct-
ing it to deliver his water on payment of the sum named. The court
below held that he must pay $1.50 per statutory inch for such delivery,
which charge was fixed by the county commissioners, and that he was
bound by the rules and regulations of the company. Johnston prose-
cutes error.
I. Johnston is entitled to run his water through the ditch and
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has no contract concerning compensation therefor and therefore he must
clearly pay his pro rata share of the upkeep of the ditch.
2. Johnston owns ten inches of water and is entitled to have
it delivered through the ditch. He has no preferential rights. He can
get only his percentage of such proportion of the priority that is avail-
able and in times of shortage the water owners must be served by resort-
ing to rotation and sectionizing.
3. When necessity demands, a resort to these expedients is as
applicable to Johnston as to other owners.-Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE-APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER-
CERTIORARI-Hendricks vs. Gates-No. 13,626-Decided Nov.
19, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
One Youtsey brought suit before Hendricks, a justice of the peace.
A third continuance of the trial was granted and the defendants there-
upon applied and were granted a writ of certiorari by the County Court
and the County Court held that the justice had abused his discretion
and rendered judgment directing the justice of the peace to dismiss the
action.
1. The order of the justice of the peace granting a continuance
was an interlocutory order and, hence the proceedings in the County
Court were premature.
2. It is only a final judgment of a lower court that can be re-
viewed on certiorari.--Judgment reversed.
WATER RIGHTS-CARRIER DITCHES-POWER TO FIX RATES FOR
CARRIAGE OF WATER-No REVERSAL OF TRIAL COURT ON
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-REs ADJUDICATA-The Northern
Colorado Irrigation Company vs. The Board of County Commis-
sioners of Arapahoe County et al.-No. 12,363-Decided Nov.
19, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. A contract between a carrier ditch company and its water con-
sumers, as to the rate to be charged by the company for carriage of water
through its ditch, is not binding on either party since the constitution
and statutes of Colorado have lodged the rate-making power in the
Board of County Commissioners of the county in which the carrier
ditch is located. The provisions of the constitution and statutes must
be read into the contract.
2. The trial court, having set aside a rate fixed by the Board of
County Commissioners as confiscatory, itself fixed a higher rate. The
rate so fixed by the trial court will not be set aside by the Supreme
Court as confiscatory; such finding was based on conflicting evidence,
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MONEY LENDERS' ACT--Gronert us. The
People-No. 13567-Decided October 22, 1934-Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
Gronert was convicted of violating the money lenders' act (Sess.
L. 1919, Ch. 159, C. L. Ch. 63). He seeks a reversal of the sentence.
1. Section 17 of Article 5 of the Colorado Constitution pro-
vides:
"* * * No bill shall be so altered or amended on its
passage through either house as to change its original pur-
pose.
The purpose of the bill as introduced was to license the business of
making small loans at a greater rate of interest than twelve per cent per
annum, and to regulate such business. However, a radical change was
made in Section 13 in its passage through the Legislature. The result
was that what the bill originally permitted was by statute made a
crime and such a change of purpose comes within the inhibition of
Section 17 of Article 5, supra.
2. The change referred to above also brings the statute into con-
flict with Section 21 of Article 5 of the Colorado Constitution. In
testing the statute by this part of the Constitution, we find that the
purpose of the statute in its entirety being not only wholly outside the
scope of the title but actually in contradiction of the purpose expressed
therein. Therefore, the entire statute violates Section 21 of Article 5
of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, supra.--Judgment re-
versed with directions to disriss.
CRIMINAL LAW-ARSON-CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE-RULE OF
PROOF-VALUE OF PROPERTY DESTROYED-INSURANCE CAR-
RIED-INSTRUCTIONS-Militello vs. The People-No. 13381-
Decided October 29, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. In prosecutions for arson, where circumstantial evidence is
used, the rule as to proof of corpus delicti and intent is the same as in
prosecutions for other crimes where reliance is made on direct evidence,
and the test is the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other than
the guilt of the defendant.
2. Circumstantial evidence is the weaving of a fabric of known
facts which, often infinitesimal or immaterial, or even prejudicial when
considered alone, become important only as they are tied to others, and
when so tied lead to inevitable conclusions as to facts in issue. Specific
evidence considered and held admissible.
3. It is not proper to show the cost of replacement of the prop-
erty destroyed. Ordinarily, the test of profit to the defendant, result-
ing from the fire, is the value of the property, especially when such
value is to be contrasted with the amount of insurance carried on the
property.
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4. Defendant is charged with the crime of arson when he is
charged with acts which are defined by statute to constitute arson.
5. It is not error to refuse an instruction tendered by defendant
when the subject matter thereof is sufficiently covered by instructions
given.--Judgment affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR-NO WRIT OF ERROR WITHOUT FINAL JUDG-
MENT-The Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Company v. Bayle-No.
13601-Decided October 29, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Even though a verdict has been received in the trial court, and a
motion for new trial filed and overruled, if no final judgment has been
entered there is no basis for an application for supersedeas and a writ
of error has no function.-Writ of error dismissed.
CONTRACTS-STATEMENTS AS TO MATTERS COVERED-PERSONS
DEALING AT ARM'S LENGTH-AGENCY-The Protective Finance
Corporation vs. The National Surety Company-No. 13040-
Decided October 29, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
1. Persons dealing at arm's length in negotiating a written con-
tract between them are bound by the provisions of the contract itself,
and neither party may profit by statements made by the other party,
prior to the execution of the contract, as to what was covered thereby.
2. Before the prior representations of an agent will be consid-
ered, his authority to make changes in the contract must be shown.
3. Representations of an agent -examined and held not to pur-
port to alter the contract.-udgment affirmed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-SALE TO MORTGAGEE FOR INADEQUATE
PRICE - ACCOUNTING - INSTRUCTIONS - The International
Harvester Company vs. The Lawrence Investment Company-
No. 13591-Decided October 29, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Bouch.
1. Where mortgaged chattels are sold at private foreclosure sale
and bid in by the mortgagee for an inadequate price, the resulting dam-
age to the mortgagor may be recovered in an action for an accounting.
2. An instruction as to the measure of damages, to which no
objection was made, states the law of the case by which both sides are
bound.--Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INSANITY OF DEFENDANT-POWER OF
COURT TO SET ASIDE VERDICT OF GUILTY-Graham vs. The
People-No. 13572-Decided October 29, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Butler.
The trial court, being convinced of the insanity of a defendant
charged with murder in the first degree, is not compelled to pronounce
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sentence of death as fixed by the jury, but has the power, and is under
the clear duty as well, to set aside the verdict of guilty and to grant a
new trial.--Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MATTERS OF Lo2.AL CONCERN- City and
County of Denver vs. Henry-No. 13574-Decided November
26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Plaintiff sues city for injuries sustained by collision between a city
truck and Henry automobile. City as one of its defenses alleged con-
tributory negligence on the part of Henry, the same being based upon
the state statute to the effect that the vehicle first entering the inter-
section has the right of way. This defense was stricken on the theory
that the right of way was governed by the city ordinance to the effect
that the vehicle approaching the intersection from the right has the
right of way.
1. Article 20, section of the Colorado Constitution, vests in all
"home rule" cities all powers necessary, requisite and proper for the
government and administration of its local and municipal affairs, and
the full right of self-government in both local and municipal affairs,
and further provides that statutes applicable shall continue in effect
except insofar as superseded by charters or ordinances. The defendant
herein is a "home rule" city.
2. Traffic rules and regulations tested from a practical stand-
point are a pure matter of local concern. Therefore, tested by the above
section of the Constitution, the city ordinance controlled this case and
the defense was properly stricken.--Judgment affirmed.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - WITHDRAWAL OF DEFENSE - Evi-
DENCE-IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES-CLOSING ARGUMENT
OF COUNSEL-Prell vs. Gormley, etc.-No. 13417-Decided No-
vember 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
1. Before the taking of evidence is concluded a defendant may
withdraw a defense and the jury may be instructed to disregard all evi-
dence concerning it. Thereafter the evidence relative to such defense
becomes wholly irrelevant.
2. Should plaintiff then adduce testimony in contradiction of
such evidence, for the ostensible purpose of showing the credibility of
defendant's witnesses, such attempted impeachment on questions which
no longer have anything to do with the case is improper and constitutes
prejudicial error.
3. A closing argument for plaintiff, wherein the improper rebut-
tal testimony offered in contradiction of the eliminated evidence is com-
mented upon as impeaching the entire testimony of defendant's
witnesses, likewise constitutes prejudicial error.--Judgment reversed.
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MOTOR VEHICLES-COLLISION-RIGHT OF WAY-PERMANENCY OF
INJURIES - INSTRUCTIONS - PROXIMATE CAUSE - SPECIAL
FINDINGS-Brown vs. Maier-No. 13600-Decided November
26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. The right of way at a Denver street intersection is controlled
by the city ordinance, not by the state statute. (Following Denver vs.
Henry, No. 13574, decided same day.)
2. Testimony by a physician as to the permanent nature of in-
juries is proper.
3. An assignment based on an objection to improper testimony
is without merit where it appears that the same witness had previously
given the same testimony without objection.
4. Requested instructions, presenting the defense of proximate
cause, but which omit the word "sole," are properly refused.
5. An instruction for special findings is discretionary. No abuse
appearing, its refusal is not error.--Judgment reversed.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-EXTENSION AFFIDAVIT-AGENT-Pring vs.
Brown-No. 13364-Decided Dec. 10, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Butter.
In an action of replevin, Pring sought to recover from Brown as
sheriff the possession of certain cattle. Judgment went against him and
he seeks a reversal thereof.
1. An affidavit for extension of a chattel mortgage may be made
by a duly authorized agent of the mortgagee or assignee.
2. Section 5093 C. L. as amended requires mortgagee or assignee
to file the extension affidavit but does not require such mortgagee or
assignee to make the affidavit himself.-Judgment reversed.
CITIES AND TOWNS-DISCONNECTION OF TERRITORY-EFFECT OF
PLATTING INTO BLOCKS-Weaver et at. vs. The Town of Little-
ton-No. 13310-Decided November 26, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Burke.
1. An action for the disconnection of territory from an incorpo-
rated iown, brought under Ch. 170, L. 1925, Colorado, which provides
for disconnection only when "no part of such area has been platted into
lots or blocks as a part of or an addition to said town," should be dis-
missed for failure of proof, where it appears that the land involved is
within the corporate limits of the town and that it has been platted into
blocks, with the adjacent streets dedicated to the use of the public.
2. Fact that such addition was platted prior to the incorporation
of the town does not change the rule; and it is immaterial that the
streets so dedicated are not continuances of other streets in the town, or
that some of such streets have not been used or improved by the town.
--Judgment affirmed.
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WILLS-REALTY SUBJECT TO LAW OF SITUS--EQUITABLE CON-
VERSION-In Re Pence's Estate-No. 13317-Decided Novem-
ber 26, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
I. Real property in Colorado is subject to the laws of Colorado
alone as to descent; and the construction of a foreign will affecting such
property must be governed by the laws of Colorado.
2. The doctrine of equitable conversion of realty into per-
sonalty cannot be invoked unless it becomes necessary in order to execute
the plain provision of the will.--Judgment affirmed.
AUTOMOBILES-NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO PERSON WHO HAS LEFT
DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE-DIRECTED VERDICT-Webster vs.
Nelson, et at.-No. 13428-Decided December 3, 1934--Opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Where it appears that one of the defendants, Mrs. Webster, had
driven plaintiff, Mrs. Nelson, in Mrs. Webster's automobile to a point
on the highway opposite Mrs. Nelson's home, and that Mrs. Nelson had
then left the Webster car, had walked around the rear of it and was
proceeding across the road toward her house when she was struck by
another car, such facts show no negligence on the part of Mrs. Webster,
and, in a suit against her and the driver of the other car, the court
should have directed a verdict in her favor.-Judgment reversed and
cause remanded with instructions.
AUTOMOBILES-RENTAL AGREEMENT-CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
AGAINST LIABILITY-EFFECT THEREOF-Universal Indemnity
Ins. Co. vs. Tenery et at.-No. 13285-Decided December 10,
1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Callahan rented an automobile from the Hertz Driv-ur-self Sys-
tem, Inc., signing a rental agreement therefor, and later in the evening.
while under the influence of liquor, negligently and carelessly collided
with a car driven by Tenery and Tenery sued Callahan and the Hertz
Driv-ur-self System for compensatoiy and exemplary damages, and the
action was dismissed as against Hertz System on the ground that they
had procured liability insurance under Chapter 122 of the Session Laws
of Colorado for 1931.
Judgment by default was entered against Callahan and garnish-
ment proceedings were had against the insurance carrier.
1. Under a carrier's insurance policy issued to a rental car service
company, the insurance carrier insures the driver of the rented vehicle
against liability.
2. The rental agreement between the driver of a car who rents
the same and the owner of the car is not a part of the contract of insur-
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ance and any provisions in such rental agreement evading liability are
non-effective.
3. Under such contract of insurance the insurance carrier is only
liable for actual damages and not for exemplary damages.
4. Where after an accident injured party makes a demand upon
the renter and also the insurance carrier for damages, and there is a denial
of liability of the insurance carrier on account of the drunkenness of the
renter and where the insurance company entered appearance defending
on a traverse in pursuance of a garnishment issued against the insurance
carrier it thereby stood solely upon the questions of liability under the
terms of the insurance policy and submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court and thereby waived its right to raise the question that the insurer
could not be bound by a judgment in a case to which there was not an
original party.-Judament affirmed but modified.
WATERS POLLUTION OF STREAM-RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF UPPER
AND LOWER PROPRIETORS-Wilmore et a[. vs. Chain O'Mines
et at.-No. 13244-Decided December 17, 1934--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Holland.
Wilmore and others were plaintiffs below and sought to enjoin the
pollution of the waters of Clear Creek by defendants. Plaintiffs are
farmers who claim that domestic use of their lands was injured by the
polluted waters. Defendants were a mining company discharging tail-
ings from their mills into Clear Creek.
Court below found generally in favor of plaintiffs for injunctive
relief but allowed defendants to discharge a limited amount of tailings
and slime per day into Clear Creek and required plaintiffs to pay their
own costs. However, the Court below expressly retained jurisdiction
for the purpose of later considering the modification of the injunctive
order.
1. Water of a natural stream may not be polluted by a mining
company discharging tailings and slime to the damage of a lower pro-
prietor using the stream for domestic purposes.
2. The property of another may not be taken because it would
be either inconvenient or expensive to the one committing the nuisance
to restrain or prevent its continuance.
3. Under such conditions a final decree permitting a partial pol-
lution by discharge of a limited amount of tailings and slime into a
stream will not be permitted. The final injunction should have been
permanent against any and all pollution.
4. Under such circumstances costs should not be awarded against
plaintiffs.-Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
Editor's Query: Where the lower Court issues a permanent injunc-
tion but retains jurisdiction for modification thereof, is this such a final
order that writ of error will lie?
A Worthwhile
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That in the New Year
1935 and the years to
come, you will enjoy
the uniform warmth
and comfort of a gas
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